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1 I NTRODUCTION  
Seismic resilience of urban areas is one of the cen-
tral topics in the actual scientific and political fields. 
Many recent disasters consolidated the idea that 
much still needs to be done to reduce human and 
economic losses due to earthquakes. 
One of the most affected networks, especially in the 
first hours after the event, is the electrical distribu-
tion network. The first news that media report is that 
a considerable number of people is left without elec-
tric supply.  
This aspect complicates situations that are already 
difficult by isolating communications from large 
parts of the cities, slowing down the rescue and 
making it harder for people to resume normal lives. 
It should not be forgotten that the quick restoration 
of such networks in critical conditions, for example 
by replacing key elements such as transformers, can 
have very high costs. Therefore, careful planning of 
the electricity grid is mandatory. In this paper the 
authors present some suggestions for dealing with 
this kind of problem. 
This paper on electric network is part of a larger 
study on a virtual city called Ideal City (Zamani 
Noori et al. 2017) that is developed to be a resilience 
based designed community. This town is freely in-
spired to the city of Turin that is a town of about one 
million inhabitants in North-West Italy. 
This study is related on the EPN (Electrical Power 
Network) but it is focused on the electrical distribu-
tion system. The electricity grid starts with genera-
tion stations located many kilometers far from urban 
centers. It continues with the transmission system 
that usually surrounds the cities and ends with the 
distribution network that carries power directly to 
consumers.  
The network components in terms of fragility curves 
are studied. Repair costs and time are also estimated 
and, finally, the improvement of the network resili-
ence is evaluated. 
This network can be affected not only by earth-
quakes but also by tornadoes, which is the first cause 
of failure of electricity in USA in terms of MW lost. 
NIST-funded Center for Risk-Based Community 
Resilience Planning (Unnikrishnan & van de Lindt 
2016) explains how the EPN of Centerville, a Virtu-
al Community Testbed of approximately 50.000 
people in a Midwestern State, can be studied in 
terms of network and losses analysis. 
This type of approach is not present only in the 
American or European literature, but it is now a very 
actual theme in many countries. For example, an in-
teresting work by Arghavani (2017) can be reported. 
This is a prototype model to analyze the seismic re-
silience of the transmission grid of the city of Qom, 
an Iranian center of quite a million citizen. 
Iran is a high seismic zone and in this study the re-
searchers have built a simplified model of the net-
work and some scenarios are shown. It is a connec-
tivity analysis, i.e. a binary statement 0 or 1, in 
which some lines fall, and it is represented the re-
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sponse of the grid in terms of recovery time by using 
a gamma cumulative distribution function. 
This type of investigation started years ago, from 
2004 Professor Shinozuka (Shinozuka et al. 2004, 
Shinozuka et al. 2007) studied the resilience of inte-
grated power and water system of the LADWP (Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power). A data-
base of effects of several previous events like the 
1994 Northridge earthquake is used. In this research, 
the critical points of the distribution network are the 
transformers and the associated fragility curves. The 
correct spatial distribution of PGA is modelled with-
in a Monte Carlo approach. Observing these results, 
the authors computed risk curves of power supply, 
households without power, economic losses and 
some system performance criteria. 
Resilience of distribution network isn’t only a uni-
versity topic, but it is strictly regulated by law. This 
year, within the end of March, all Italian DSOs (Dis-
tribution System Operators) have been required to 
deliver a resiliency plan of their networks to national 
authority for electricity gas and water. 
 
2 METHODOLOGY  
2.1  Model of the network 
The first problem of the present study consists in the 
limitation of available data. Information about dis-
tribution buses of an urban network is very difficult 
to be collected. Sensible data are usually not shared 
because some security standards or economic inter-
est may be compromised. So, the idea is to try to 
find an electric grid compatible with the map of Ide-
al City. The approach selected is summarized in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of the approach 
 
 
Building a power supply network for one million 
people cannot be developed immediately. Therefore, 
a literature review of existing case studies has been 
done. Then, the selected case has been adapted to an 
Ideal City sample. 
The European Commission in collaboration with the 
Distribution System Operators Observatory of JRC 
(Joint Research Center) released a technical report 
(Prettico et al. 2016) about representative networks. 
They have collected data from 79 out of 190 Euro-
pean DSOs that are representative of the 70% of the 
electricity supplied by all DSOs serving over 
100,000 customers. They distribute more than 2,000 
TWh of electricity to over 200 million customers per 
year, covering a total area of more than 3 million 
square km.  
This information has been used to build 36 indica-
tors about network structure, network design and 
distributed generation. From 10 of these indicators 
representative distribution networks have been ob-
tained using RNM (Reference Network Model). This 
is a useful software for large scale distribution plan-
ning developed by the Universidad Pontificia Comil-
las (Domingo et al. 2011). 
In this paper, “urban” network from JRC database is 
used for the most densely populated districts and the 
“semi-urban” one for the surrounding areas. 
The second step is to make this network independent 
from the map that JRC has used to realize the model. 
In these files, information about HV (high voltage), 
MV (medium voltage) and LV (low voltage) buses 
with coordinates, branches, electric parameters and 
protections are provided. In order to apply this real-
istic network to Ideal City, LV data are relevant only 
for defining the total amount of consumers, not for 
their real positions. So, only HV and MV buses are 
explicitly considered in the model. Finally, the net-
work model is rebuilt writing a new description. 
The network has not been freely projected, but it has 
been strictly controlled using Matpower6.0, a pack-
age of MATLAB M-files for solving power flow 
and optimal power flow problems developed by 
PSERC (Power Systems Engineering Research Cen-
ter) at Cornell University (Zimmerman et al. 2011). 
The method for the network performance analysis 
consists in the computation of the load flow on the 
entire damaged grid. In this way, a higher precision 
respect to a simpler and faster connectivity analysis 
(Arghavani 2017) is provided. Analyzes made by 
Matpower follow the Newton Raphson (NR) algo-
rithm, which solves this nonlinear equation problem. 
In the AC power flow problem (Zimmerman et al. 
2011), the nodal bus injections are matched to the 
injections from loads and generators. The power 
balance equations are expressed in complex matrix 
form as  
 
   , 0S bus d g gg V Sg S V S C S          (1) 
 
where Sbus(V) is the complex power injections as 
functions of the complex bus voltages V, Sd are con-
stant power loads, Sg is the generator injections and 
the Cg is the connection matrix. 
This problem can be split into its real P and reactive 
Q components: 
 
   , , , 0P m g bus m d g gg V P P V P C P        (2) 
   , , , 0Q m g bus m d g gg V Q Q V Q C P        (3) 
 
where   is the voltage angle and Vm is the voltage 
magnitude. The power flow problem could be a set 
of equations in the form 
 
  0g x                   (4) 
 
And in particular  
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  (5) 
 
where PQ buses are pure load buses and they repre-
sent the major part of all of network buses. In these 
elements P and Q are defined, but   and Vm must be 
calculated.  
PV buses are connected to the generator and they are 
a small part of all buses. In these elements P and Vm  
are defined, but Q and must be calculated (Grainger 
& Stevenson 1994). 
Is also important to specify the value of x, as: 
 
      
   m
for all busesexcept Referencebus
x
V for PQbuses
   
 
    (6) 
 
where the Reference bus is the slack bus and it is 
considered as the number one of the network. In this 
element, 0o  , Vm is known but P and Q must be 
computed. 
So, a nonlinear system (Dharamjit & Tanti 2012) 
with npv + npq equations and unknowns (n is the 
number of PV or PQ buses) results. Solving by x, 
it’s possible to determine the generator real power 
injections at the reference bus and generator power 
injections. 
These solutions are provided using the iterative 
NR’s method. Starting from an initial trial solution, 
at each iteration, a tolerance must be smaller than a 
predetermined threshold. So, the passages are these: 
It starts with 
 
 ( )g x g
 
 
  

                (7) 
the solution at first iteration is 
 
  (0) ( )kx x x                     (8) 
 
and the following ones in general are expressed as  
The tolerance is computed as 
 
  ( ) ( )kk g g x
 
            

             (9) 
 
If the tolerance doesn’t become smaller than the 
threshold, the function [g(x)] is represented as a se-
ries, involving the Jacobian matrix computed at 
[x]=[x(k)]. They can be written as [J(k)]. 
 
Finally 
 
   ( )( )k kkg x J x g
 
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        (10) 
and so 
 
 ( ) ( )kk kJ x                        (11) 
 
The NR’s method linearizes the nonlinear system 
and, therefore, the Jacobian matrix is composed by 
constant values function of the unknows. 
After the modelling of the network, the load flow is 
computed through the MATLAB code. If the NR’s 
method converges (Figure 2) in few iterations and 
the power restraints are respected, the grid is proper-
ly designed. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of convergence with the NR’s method and 
restraints for a hypothetic network. 
 
2.2 Resilience Index 
The Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity Gas 
and Water suggests to compute the resilience of an 
electric grid focus on the risk of disabling users in 
case of hazard or extreme weather conditions (The 
Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity Gas and 
Water, 2017). 
This index is called IRI and is calculated as 
 
IRI NUD PD               (12) 
 
where NUD is the number of LV users disabled and 
PD is probability of disservice. This chance is  
 
1/PD TR                (13) 
 
where TR is the return time of the event, calculated 
in accordance with the European standard CEI EN 
50341 (EN 50341-2-13). For a safe calculation we 
will take 50-years as return time. 
An assessment of resilience can be obtained by 
computing the inverse of the risk index, thus obtain-
ing 
 
/IRE TR NUD              (14) 
 
where IRE is the resilience index, or calculating the 
integer over time of the IRI index. 
Another resilience rating can be given in term of 
ENS (Energy Not Supplied) to highlight the power 
delivered before the event and the time it takes to re-
store it. 
2.3 Fragility and Restoration 
The first assumption of this study is to concentrate 
the fragility of the network in medium voltage sub-
stations (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical indoor MV substation. Image taken from 
http://electrical-engineering-portal.com/ 
 
To model their fragility researchers have used the 
HAZUS®-MH MR5 (FEMA 2002) that provides 
sets of fragility curves for unanchored elements. 
This means that the components are assumed with-
out any seismic protection and designed with normal 
requirements. This hypothesis is introduced because 
the goal is to estimate the worst-case scenario’s 
probability of exceedance.  
Medium voltage substations are composed by im-
portant equipment as transformers, switches, circuit 
breakers etc. Furthermore, they are assumed as in-
stalled in buildings, so they can be also affected by 
the structural damages. Table 1 reports the damage 
conditions. 
 
Table 1. Description of damage states 
Damage state     Description 
Complete  component OR building 100% damaged  
Extensive  component OR building 70% damaged 
Moderate  component OR building 40% damaged 
Minor   component OR building 5% damaged 
 
Fragility curves of the components implement the 
PGA (Peak Ground Acceleration in [g]) as seismic 
intensity parameters. They are lognormal function 
defined through logarithmic mean λ and logarithmic 
standard deviation ß. Table 2 summarizes the im-
plemented fragility curves parameters. Figure 4 de-
picts the resulting fragility functions. 
 
Table 2. Fragility parameters for medium voltage substations 
with unanchored components (Cavalieri et al. 2014). 
Damage state     λ   ß 
Complete     -0.69  0.4 
Extensive     -1.2  0.4 
Moderate     -1.61  0.5 
Minor      -2.3  0.6 
 
 
Figure 4. Fragility curves for medium voltage substations with 
standard components 
 
The simulation considers an increasing set of PGAs 
and the resulting outcomes of the network are evalu-
ated. In these scenarios, MV substations failed and 
consumers are without power. 
The resilience of the system is evaluated in terms of 
MW lost due to people without electricity for a cer-
tain period, costs and time due to repair activities. 
About the restoration consequences, authors refer to 
HAZUS Technical Manual (FEMA 2002). Figure 5 
reports the adopted restoration functions. 
 
Figure 5. Discretized Restoration Functions for electric substa-
tions 
 
In the restoration analyzes the focus is moved on 
transformers (Figure 6) because they can be consid-
ered the most critical substations components.  
 
 
Figure 6. Typical MV/LV distribution transformer. Image tak-
en from http://www.directindustry.it/ 
 
In general, (Cataliotti 1983-1999) they are electro-
magnetic induction static facilities, which modify 
power values from a primary circuit (receiver) to a 
secondary one (deliver)  
Distribution transformers MV/LV have a three-
column core, concentric windings, wire-wired con-
ductors for small sections, flat for the major. They 
can be classified according to many parameters such 
as insulating material with which they are protected 
from high operating temperatures, depending on the 
service and cooling mode. In this case, however, 
they have been classified according to the nominal 
power that can be delivered. There are five classes 
of transformers (Prettico et al. 2016) as reported in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Classes of transformers and type of network in which 
are present 
Transformers power (kVA)   Network 
100           Semi-urban 
250           Semi-urban 
400           Semi-urban, Urban 
630           Semi-urban, Urban 
1000           Semi-urban, Urban 
 
About transformers costs, authors refer to PACT, a 
FEMA tool to analyze the seismic performance as-
sessment of structural and non-structural compo-
nents (FEMA P-58-3 2016). Data are given in US 
dollar (USD) but they have been converted in euros 
(€) with 1.2 as exchange rate (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Repair cost of transformers related to their quantities 
 
It is also important to take into account the correla-
tion between the damage state and the transformers 
serviceability and power availability, as Table 4 
summarizes.  
 
Table 4. Relation damage state – power supply 
Damage state   Serviceability       Power 
Complete    Not repairable      No 
Extensive    Operational after repairs   No 
Moderate    Operational without repairs  Reduced 
Minor     Operational without repairs  Reduced 
3 APPLICATION 
3.1 Network description 
The case study employed for the application of the 
method consists in the Ideal City’s district of Crocet-
ta. It is a very central and urbanized area of Turin, 
full of residential buildings, offices and schools such 
as the university Politecnico di Torino. The popula-
tion is about 40,000 people. During the day, such 
number of population increases. 
So, the “urban" network from the JRC database is 
employed and adapted to the Crocetta’s case, being 
suitable for about 50,000 users. Figure 8 shows the 
satellite image of the considered district. 
 
 
Figure 8. Crocetta’s picture from the satellite with its borders 
highlighted in red 
 
The grid is composed by five feeders, which supply 
12735 housing units (supposing a mean of 4 people 
per unit) and 38 MV consumers. There is only one 
HV/MV substation from 132 to 20 kV with 80 MVA 
of rated power and 126 MV/LV substations from 20 
to 0.4 kV (Prettico et al. 2016). About the latter 126 
MV/LV substations, they are detailed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Number of transformers per each class 
Rated power (kVA)   Number 
1000         34 
630         52 
400         40 
 
This distribution network is presented in Figure 9, 
while Figure 10 shows the overlap of the same grid 
with the district map, as obtained by some simplifi-
cation from the real map of Turin (Zamani Noori et 
al. 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Urban network with MV buses in evidence 
 
 
Figure 10. Overlap buildings-network 
 
3.2 Crocetta fragility and resilience 
In this work, repair costs and down time analysis are 
evaluated, so it is supposed to refer to a “damage 
state” situation for the network. In particular, “ex-
tensive” damage in Table 4 (with NO power and 
“Operational after repairs” conditions) for the net-
work is considered. It is assumed that power can be 
feed only after grid restoration, which consists in 
components repairing. Indeed, resilience is studied 
for limited damage conditions, not for complete 
damage of components and buildings. 
Looking at the correspondent fragility curve (Figure 
4) it is clear that up to 0.2g the grid does not suffer 
   HV/MV sub-
station 
any damage. From 0.3g level, substations have the 
50% probability of exceedance and with a 0.5g this 
percentage goes to about 90%. 
So, an event with a magnitude between 0.3g-0.5g, 
can cause the power interruption and the steps until 
the complete restoration are considered for the pre-
sent application. 
Observing the repair time for MV buses, that is the 
substation (Figure 5), there is more than 50% chance 
of having the complete restoration in less than 10 
days. In the following, the transformers case is ana-
lyzed in detail and the repairs specifications (FEMA 
P-58-3 2016) are shown is in steps (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Steps of repairs 
After     Transformers repaired 
4 days    400 kVA 
6 days    400, 630 kVA 
7 days    400, 630, 1000 kVA 
 
To give an assessment of resilience we calculate the 
IRI risk index, if the event occurs at the hypothetic 
day 2 of a simulation. (Figure 11) 
 
Figure 11. IRI index 
 
A second evaluation can be given in terms of lost 
energy, the ENS trend is as follows (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. ENS per day 
3.3 Cost analysis and improvements 
As has been shown, a week is necessary for the 
complete restoration and this implying a huge loss of 
power. For an assignment of 4 kWh per user, the to-
tal amount for a district of the Ideal City, as the Cro-
cetta case, consists in about 0.3 GWh. Considering 
the typical single-band price of 0.065€/kWh, the 
economic losses amount over 20,000 €. Accounting 
the repairs costs, losses further increase.  
 
Figure 13. Transformers repair costs repartition 
 
As reported in Figure 13, for the PGA in the range 
0.3g-0.5g, the total amount of costs for the trans-
formers consists of 3.85 million euros. Adding the 
ENS costs with those ones from the restoration of 
the electrical equipment, 4-5 million euros result. 
To improve network resilience, it may be useful to 
employ substations specifically designed for seismic 
conditions. Indeed, they are characterized by differ-
ent fragility curves (Figure 14) with respect to the 
standard case in Figure 2. Fixing 0.5g PGA, the 
standard case defines about 90% probability of fail-
ure while the seismic case 50%. So, an essential dif-
ference can be highlighted. 
 
Figure 14. Fragility curves for medium voltage substations 
with seismic components 
 
Finally, the networks interdependency has to be tak-
en into account following the approach developed by 
Cimellaro et al. (2016). The fragility of electrical 
components is connected to failure’s probability of 
buildings system in the district, where substations 
are installed. Besides, the electric network failure it-
self induces a series of cascading effects, as summa-
rized in the scheme of Figure 15.  
This research team (Cimellaro et al. 2016, Zamani 
Noori et al. 2017, Cimellaro et al. 2017) is deepen-
ing the cascading effects at the urban scale, creating 
a macroscale model through finite element (FE) 
analysis of buildings structures, debris and through 
connectivity matrices of the networks nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. At the top of the figure is shown the indirect fragili-
ty of the power grid. At the bottom are presented some cascad-
ing effects triggered by blackouts or power reductions.  
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper is proposing a new methodology to esti-
mate the performance and its inherent resilience of a 
power distribution network.  
The steps are the following: (i) referring to electrical 
characteristics of urban representative network. (ii) 
Adapting the data to a specific map focusing on MV 
buses. (iii) Applying an earthquake hazard with a 
certain PGA. (iv) Estimating the grid response using 
fragility curves of MV substations and finally (v) de-
termining the economic losses with repair costs and 
time curves.  
Furthermore, measures for improving resilience are 
suggested by employing seismic retrofits in substa-
tions. The interaction of EPN with other networks is 
also mentioned and will be studied in further re-
searches in the future. 
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